Modes of Distinction v Existence of the Divine Persons

[thejack]

Semi-technical question.

Granted as basic and obvious that the only distinction between the Divine Persons is in their relations, and indeed, the relations just constitute the Persons: my question is why, or in what manner, the procession of the Word--that is, generation--and the procession of Love--that is, the double-procession of the Holy Spirit--why or in what manner are these two processions not sufficient to distinguish between the Persons? If the processions are their mode of existence and the relations their mode of distinction, why is the mode of existence not sufficient to account for the distinction between the Persons?

I feel like I can talk my way around this and make sense of it. I'm not certain I can say this precisely, which may be an issue with terminology or, more likely, a nuance I'm missing.

Thoughts?

[Doom]

I've read this a half dozen times and I'm still not sure what exactly you are asking, have you read St Augustine's book on the Trinity?
'

[Obi-Wan Kenobi]

I'm not sure but that's it's two ways of describing the same phenomenon.

[thejack]

I've read this a half dozen times and I'm still not sure what exactly you are asking, have you read St Augustine's book on the Trinity?
'

The relevant portions, yes. I'm entirely open to there being something there I've missed, but I don't think that particular text answers the question. And that's not really surprising, because the Persons subsisting as relations and this being the only thing that differentiates them is really only there in germ form. We haven't really, by the fourth century, gone so far down the rabbit hold yet.

I'm not sure but that's it's two ways of describing the same phenomenon.

Maybe, but that might (maybe?) raise an issue in reading Aquinas. In ST 1a.27, Thomas deals with the two processions; in 28, with the relations. I read that as the processions of the (two) Persons and the relations that are (not between) the Persons. An immediate objection to saying these are the same is just numerical; there are two processions and four relations (three of them Personal). Moreover, it isn't obvious to me that processions have oppositions whereas relations do. And if they were the same, the discussion of relations seems superfluous, insofar as Thomas could have just stopped at q27 and stated, these are the Persons, so that the First Person is unoriginated; the Second Person is the procession of the Word; the Third Person is the procession of Love. That seems to allow for real distinctions within the Trinity without reference to relations.

My concern for this approach might be that it introduces composition into God. If the Persons just are the processions (rather than they just are the relations), then it would seem that the Persons--being real--would really be related to each other; but if the Persons are not identical with the relations, then they would have relations. But that would be an accident, and thus we have substance/accident composition.

So if we want to say that the Persons are identical with the essence and distinct from one another without introduction composition, we have to say that the Persons are the relations (not that the Persons have relations between them). And that works for me, but that (again) suggests that the mode of origin isn't the same phenomenon as the mode of distinction. Now if I'm on the right track, fine. I'm still curious about a principled reason within the notion of procession itself by which it cannot be a proper grounding of the Persons. The argument above might work, but I think at most it shows that the relations are necessary and that the processions are not sufficient. But it doesn't tell me within the processions themselves are insufficient, which seems important, because all three Persons really do have real and distinct modes of existence (even as we deny that there are real distinctions in the Trinity other the relations). I'm thinking the issue here is that the mode of existence follows upon and has meaning in virtue of the mode of distinction, so it might not be all that meaningful to talk about the mode of existence without first presuming the mode of distinction. If so, going back to the hermeneutical issue with Aquinas, he might be presenting the processions first and the relations second as a matter of pedagogy; but really, it might be the case that the relations are the more fundamental. And now I'm about to go off on another rabbit trail, so I'll stop here. But that's where my thoughts are and have been.

Entirely open to being told I'm out in left field and that I need to be reined back in.

[gherkin]

I'm not able to try to get into this stuff at this time, but I can recommend Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange's commentary on the passages you just mentioned as a starting point for you: https://www.ewtn.com/catholicism/librar ... ator-10197

I'm not sure he'll answer your question, but at least he'll lay out St. Thomas's view pretty clearly. I have the feeling that you're missing something about how distinctions work in St. Thomas, but as I say, unfortunately I'm not able to really think about this right now.

[thejack]

I have the feeling that you're missing something about how distinctions work in St. Thomas

I strongly suspect if not this precisely then this generally is the case. I have independent reasons for agreeing with this assessment. I'll read RGL on this soon. Doing a short lit review on another subject today and tomorrow. Thank you much!

[Doom]

By the way, I didn't suggest Augustine's essay because I thought it would answer your question, but because I think it is a good introduction to Trinitarian theology, and I think sometimes clarifying the basics is the best way to begin exploring an advanced topic.